{"id":6211,"date":"2020-12-17T20:05:33","date_gmt":"2020-12-17T19:05:33","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/dev.inkovema.de\/?p=6211"},"modified":"2022-09-19T19:52:49","modified_gmt":"2022-09-19T17:52:49","slug":"generational-conflicts-what-potential-for-conflict-actually-exists-between-the-generations","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/dev.inkovema.de\/en\/blog\/generational-conflicts-what-potential-for-conflict-actually-exists-between-the-generations\/","title":{"rendered":"Generational conflicts – What potential for conflict actually exists between the generations?"},"content":{"rendered":"

Intergenerational conflicts? The generation model can't be a merry-go-round!<\/strong><\/h1>\n

\u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\n

What potential for conflict actually exists between the generations<\/h2>\n

<\/h3>\n

Summary<\/em><\/strong><\/h3>\n

The literature on generational differences is vast. It is largely anecdotal, plausible, contradictory and, on the whole, not worth much when it comes to dealing with the potential for conflict within a company. It serves the purpose of simple categorisation, promises clear formulas and, above all, entertaining storytelling that shines with socio-historical half-knowledge. <\/i>For the most part, it is not suitable for the serious handling of internal company conflicts, especially between different age groups and generations. Nor is it suitable for age-group-specific management work, generation-adapted personnel development or other efforts to pigeonhole employees.<\/em><\/p>\n

This is because the data available in the German Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP) from over thirty years of German history does not allow any such differential conclusions to be drawn (Schr\u00f6ter 2018).<\/em><\/p>\n<\/div>

Introduction<\/u><\/h2>\n

In recent years, it has become common practice to differentiate between generations, to work out key characteristics, to conduct large and small surveys, to carry out elaborate and less elaborate studies – and generally to do a lot of research and publish even more. In the process, differences were identified that were also attributed to characteristics, personality traits and generational affiliations.<\/p>\n

From this, management literature as well as trade union literature developed explanatory patterns for leadership issues, conflict resolution and problem descriptions, personnel and organisational development measures, management trainers and career coaches as well as for membership recruitment. Many set about constructing the most appropriate mental pigeonholes possible in order to deal not only with the complexity of individual people, but also to be able to identify group and generational patterns that would enable prescriptive reactions.<\/p>\n

One important realisation<\/strong> of a survey of the literature can be anticipated here – and will be confirmed immediately in the following text (with all the necessary evidence already compiled by sociologist Martin Schr\u00f6ter in 2018): There are differences between people<\/strong>The fact that some of these people are already of retirement age, while others have not even started their working lives, makes it very difficult to determine the age of the people categorised in these cohorts. An 80-year-old thinks differently about political and voluntary work than an 18-year-old. This realisation is trivial, albeit important for gaining further insights. The decisive question is to what extent the 80-year-old thought about it when he was forty or twenty. In addition, person A's categorisation of what is particularly important in his life (e.g. family) and what is less important (e.g. professional success) does not mean that professional success is less important to person A than to person B, who has indicated that professional success is particularly important and family is less important. Not only could there be ten, twenty or even more years between these rankings, but A's ranking with regard to values I, II and III does not allow any conclusions to be drawn about B's rankings. Value I may be less important for A in comparison to value II, but this does not mean that value I (of person A) is also less important in comparison to value I of B.<\/p>\n

One Further insight<\/strong> that an overview of the more or less specialised literature provides: The characteristics assigned to the individual cohorts by the individual authors are not only different, but sometimes diametrically opposed. For example, Generation Y is said to be very important in terms of professional success (Hurrelmann and Albrecht 2014, p. 33), while Krause (2015, p. 32) states that this is the cohort that is most important in the future. unimportant<\/em>. Now these contradictions could still be declared as different research results and as an inconsistent research situation, so that it is difficult to speak of a scientific consensus.<\/p>\n

But enough preamble.<\/p>\n

Below you will find a compilation of key literature on the topic, which is summarised in a chart at the end. The conclusions that can be drawn from the above with regard to conflict management are presented at the end.<\/p>\n<\/div>

The differences between the generations - a myth?<\/b><\/h2>\n

The division of the population into generations is widespread in sociology and is used both in research and in practice to develop concepts for personnel management and development, and to explain how and why conflicts arise and occur between certain age groups.<\/p>\n

A new generation emerges approximately every fifteen years, according to the often widespread idea in research. The respective cohorts are labelled with various characteristics, similar to a person. These characterisations of the age cohorts, which are now declared to be distinct generations, labelled and treated as unchangeable in a psychological sense, are now used to develop strategies for leadership, personnel development, but also for conflict prevention and management.<\/p>\n

If the division of the population into generations and their individual characterisations become the basis for action, leadership and conflict management concepts, it may be advisable to specifically examine what was differentiated in the characterisation process and whether belonging to a (claimed) generation is actually the cause of any personal values. In view of the generation-independent data collections on the German population in the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), there are at least considerable concerns regarding the alleged differences (Schr\u00f6ter 2018).<\/p>\n

The generations at a glance<\/b><\/h2>\n

1. the traditionalists (born 1925 – 1940)<\/b><\/h3>\n

The oldest group of the more or less uniformly modelled generations are the so-called traditionalists. This generation, also known as the \"Sceptical generation<\/strong>\" are those born between 1925 and 1940.<\/p>\n

Traditionalists are seen as having little interest in politics (Herbert<\/i> 2003, S. 104; Schelsky <\/i>1957, p. 488f.) and social and political commitment (Schelsky <\/i>1957, p. 488f.). This stems from their experience with National Socialism. They had grown up with its ideology and the promises of the National Socialist leaders and had experienced the „deep fall“. At the same time, this „deep fall“ was rather or also a victory for humanity. It therefore seems no less plausible that this generation had a strong interest in a policy that would safeguard this. Nevertheless, this generation of those born between 1925 and 1940 is said to be much more sceptical and distrustful than other generations, especially subsequent generations (Schelsky <\/i>1957, p. 488f.). In view of the developments in the 1960s (keyword: APO), one might be surprised here. However, a happy marriage or partnership was particularly important to this generation (Schelsky <\/i>1957, p. 488f.). Here one might ask whether this generation was concerned with marriage and partnership or a happy one, because this will be significant for the following generations, who have (or were able to!) get divorced more often, and who therefore cannot be said to have valued marriage and partnership less if the divorces and shorter relationships had not been so common.\u00a0the very goal of creating a happy\u00a0<\/em>to find or start a marriage and partnership. But the '68 generation is said to have been less interested in marriage and partnership…(not „ever“! Apropos 68er-Generation…)<\/p>\n

2. the '68 generation (born 1941 – 1955)<\/b><\/h3>\n

The generation of '68 includes those born between 1941 and 1955.<\/p>\n

In contrast to their predecessors, a happy marriage or partnership is said to be less important to them. They have tended to question family and gender models (Herbert<\/i> 2003, p. 110; cf. Boltanski and Chiapello<\/i> 2001, p. 468f.). Self-realisation (Hurrelmann and Albrecht <\/i>2014, p. 19f.; Herbert<\/i> 2003, p. 110; cf. Boltanski and Chiapello 2001, p. 468f.<\/i>), while professional success is correspondingly unimportant to her (Hurrelmann and Albrecht <\/i>2014, p. 19f.). Even if they are supposed to be a generation with a high level of interest in politics, L\u00fcscher and Liegle<\/i> and Wirth<\/i> call them a \"politically active generation\" (L\u00fcscher and Liegle<\/i> 2003, S. 31; Wirth<\/i> 2001, p. 14), this is in contradiction to the statement by both Herrmann<\/i> as well as Herbert<\/i>that only a few members of the '68 generation were actually politically or socially engaged (Herrmann<\/i> 2003, S. 161; Herbert<\/i> 2003, S. 113). So what has stuck in the collective everyday memory is at best the extreme or the decisive, but not the normal and thus the majority-defining.<\/p>\n

3. the baby boomers (born 1956 – 1965)<\/b><\/h3>\n

The generation known as baby boomers includes everyone born between 1956 and 1965. That's only nine years, but so be it.<\/p>\n

At the time when they entered the labour market, these baby boomers were confronted with the challenges of the oil crisis, empty motorways, the Cold War arms race and (for the first time in decades) rising unemployment. This resulted in a pronounced concern about the security of their jobs and their own economic situation (Parment<\/i> 2013, S. 8). They are the generation of neoliberalism, unleashed financial markets and a unique wave of globalisation of the industrial and commercial giants, not just the financial markets. Baby boomers are also characterised by the fact that professional success is particularly important to them, according to Parment <\/i>(Parment<\/i> 2013, S. 8). Nevertheless, they are Hurrelmann and Albrecht, Rahn<\/i> on the other hand, to attach great importance to self-realisation and quality of life (Hurrelmann and Albrecht <\/i>2014, S. 23; Rahn<\/i> 2014, p. 2), even more than all other generations. Small<\/i> on the other hand, assumes that self-realisation plays or played only a minor role for baby boomers (Small <\/i>2003, S. 105).<\/p>\n

Like its predecessor generation, it (was) politically interested, but in contrast to the generation of 1968, it was also politically and socially engaged (Oertel<\/i> 2014, S.\u00a0 <\/span>35).<\/p>\n

4th generation X (born 1966 – 1980)<\/b><\/h3>\n

All those born between 1966 and 1980 belong to Generation X.<\/p>\n

This generation appears to be extremely versatile and changeable. On the one hand, its representatives are said to believe that \"work is their central purpose in life\". This means that professional success is extremely important for Generation X (Oertel<\/i> 2014, S. 48). Leisure time only plays a minor role (Oertel<\/i> 2014, S. 48). At the same time, however, she has a \"preference for self-development\" (Oertel<\/i> 2014, p. 49) and is strongly interested in a healthy work-life balance (Oertel<\/i> 2014, S. 48). Hurrelmann and Albrecht<\/i> speak of the fact that Generation X has no desire to work at all (Hurrelmann and Albrecht<\/i> 2014, S. 23).<\/p>\n

Just as contradictory as the assumptions about the importance of self-realisation and career are the statements about Generation X's attitude to a happy marriage or partnership. According to Oertel<\/i> family is a high priority for those born between 1966 and 1980 (Oertel<\/i> 2014, p. 49), which contradicts both the assumption that work is the centre of their lives and the statement by Goebel and Clermont<\/i>that they had moved away from the role models of their parents (Goebel and Clermont<\/i> 1997, S. 10).<\/p>\n

\n

Everyone can use all the existing attributions to the generations as they wish.<\/p>\n

But a generational model is not a merry-go-round.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n<\/div>

Insert: Xennials (born 1977-1983)<\/strong><\/h3>\n

The „discovery of a small cohort born in the years 1977-1983, which may not really feel like they belong to Generation Y, but also not to Generation X, shows just what (differential) blossoms this idea of the generation model can produce, without the result necessarily being boring or implausible, but rather highly entertaining and „also somehow true“. So why not? They are a separate group, the Xennials.<\/p>\n

However, we are not on solid scientific ground here, but in the waters of the feuilleton, shallow, entertaining, anecdotal. But neither insightful nor grounded in data. It describes self-images and images of others, but not objectified and profiled social patterns.<\/p>\n<\/div>